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Abstract
 
Josiah T. Grover: Andrew J. Goodpaster Jr., 1915-1947: The Making of a Political-Military 
Officer 
(Under the direction of Richard H. Kohn) 
 
 General Andrew J. Goodpaster served in the US Army for thirty-nine years and 
participated in many of the most important events of the Cold War, from planning nuclear 
strategy in the Pentagon to serving as President Eisenhower’s national security aide, then as 
director of the Joint Staff, the assistant commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, and finally as the superintendent at West Point.  In each of these 
assignments Goodpaster participated in major Cold War events and the simultaneous 
development of the American national security state.  The emergence of the national security 
state and the changes in political-military affairs that accompanied it changed both the character 
and the role of the military profession in the United States in substantial ways.  Andrew 
Goodpaster’s career exemplified that change.  This thesis examines Goodpaster’s early life and 
career from 1915-1947 to discover the foundations of his later, more prominent career.
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 There are many people whose patience and support have contributed to this project, 
including: Prof. Richard H. Kohn, Prof. Joseph T. Glatthaar, Prof. Wayne E. Lee, LTC Gregory 
Daddis, and the 2007 history cohort at UNC-Chapel Hill; Paul Barron and Peggy Dillard at the 
Marshall Foundation Research Library; COL Dan Karbler, COL Brian Dunn, and LTC Paul 
Nichols of the 3rd Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment; and most importantly, Darien 
and Will Grover, without whom this project would never have been completed, and whose 
support, encouragement, and patience despite frequent absences has meant more than they will 
ever know.   
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 
I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………..1 
II. Childhood and the Depression ………………..……………………………….5 
III. West Point and the Making of an Officer……………………………………13 
IV. World War Two and the Testing of an Officer.……………………………..29 
V. An Education in Political-Military Affairs…………………………………..55 
References……………………………………………………………………………….....71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
The piece of shrapnel was small, probably no more than an inch long, but when it 
punched through Andrew Goodpaster’s right elbow on the night of 2 February 1944 it had an 
impact far larger than its relative size.  When the artillery shells exploded near a cluster of 
jeeps in central Italy, the twenty-nine year old lieutenant colonel was meeting with his 
battalion staff on the outskirts of Monte Cassino, site of one of the hardest fought battles of 
the Italian campaign in World War II.  The wound to his elbow was a “million-dollar wound” 
- severe enough to require evacuation, but not bad enough to kill or permanently maim. 
Goodpaster was lucky – an eighth of an inch deeper, and he would have lost his arm.1  
Goodpaster was evacuated from the Mediterranean Theater and arrived at Fitzsimmons Army 
Hospital in Denver in May 1944.2  
Goodpaster healed and went on to a long and successful career in the army, earned 
the four stars of a General, and retired in 1981, almost universally respected within the army 
and the U.S. Government as a soldier, scholar, and diplomat.  Throughout his long career, he 
                                                 
1
 Proceedings of Disposition Board, 36th General Hospital, 27 March 1944, Box 4, FF 4/3, 48th Battalion 
Expenses, Andrew J. Goodpaster Collection, Marshall Foundation Research Library, Lexington, VA, Collection 
230.  [Hereafter source material from the Goodpaster Collection will be referred to as AJG Collection 230 or 
231-A, as appropriate];   “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American 
Folklife Center, Library of Congress),” http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/loc.natlib.afc2001001.29916, 
Video File. [This source consists of a 77 minute video-taped interview of Goodpaster and 6 separate audio 
recordings.  Numbers 1-4 are from Goodpaster’s final months in the hospital in 2005.  Numbers 5 & 6 were 
recorded in 1996.] 
2
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” DVD, 2001, Goodpaster Collection 231-A, Marshall Foundation Research Library, Box 11, DVD 
#7, File 1. [These interviews were recorded between 2001 and 2004, and then recorded as video files on DVDs 
for storage.]   
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was involved to a greater or lesser degree in the conduct of political-military affairs as a 
strategic planner, presidential aide, and the commander of NATO forces.3    From the end of 
World War II through the early days of the Reagan administration Andrew Goodpaster 
participated in many of the most important events of the Cold War, from planning nuclear 
strategy in the Pentagon to serving as President Eisenhower’s national security aide, then as 
director of the Joint Staff, the assistant commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, and finally as the superintendent at West Point.  In each of these 
assignments Goodpaster participated in major Cold War events and the simultaneous 
development of the American national security state.  The emergence of the national security 
state and the changes in political-military affairs that accompanied it changed both the 
character and the role of the military profession in the United States in substantial ways.  
Andrew Goodpaster’s career exemplified that change.   
Goodpaster’s life and career from 1915 through 1947 provided the foundation for his 
later, more influential assignments during the Cold War.  His childhood, education, and 
experiences shaped who he was and how he emerged as a rising star in the War Department.  
The events of that period revealed why Goodpaster was selected for various assignments, and 
by whom, as well as the significance of those linkages to Goodpaster’s later career. His 
experiences also illuminated the military’s socialization and protégé system before, during, 
and after World War II.4  Perhaps more importantly, Andrew Goodpaster’s early career 
                                                 
3
 For the purposes of this thesis I define political-military affairs as the connection between policy and strategy.  
The particular policy focus is national security policy, the political statement of objectives that the military and 
other government agencies are tasked to achieve.  Military strategy, then, is designed to achieve the goals stated 
in policy.  The relationship between these two grew much closer in the years after WWII, particularly after the 
introduction of nuclear weapons.  That is not to say the connection always occurred; a disjunction between the 
two has persisted to a greater or lesser degree ever since the end of WWII.    
4
 See Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Free Press, 1974), 125-127, 
145.  
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revealed a change in officer career patterns that developed in the immediate post-war period 
as the army tried to come to grips with the military’s new role in the U.S. government.  These 
changes in career patterns gave some officers, like Goodpaster, advanced educational 
opportunities and established new paths for assignment and promotion.  The increased 
complexity of political-military problems after World War II seemed to demand new ways of 
thinking about war, strategy, and national policy.  Some senior leaders within the military, 
and particularly within the army, responded to these demands by adapting their approach to 
officer professional development for selected individuals, thereby creating a group of officers 
with unconventional career paths, including political-military officers.5    
While political-military officers were not unique to this period, attempts by senior 
leaders to identify promising officers and secure advanced education for them reflected, to 
some degree, a departure from the pre-World War II professional mentoring relationships 
between senior leaders and young officers with potential.6  In this way, Andrew Goodpaster’s 
early career not only illustrated the continuity of patronage through the post-war period, but 
also demonstrated how advanced education came to augment, and to some degree replace, 
the informal mentoring dynamics of the old army.  Goodpaster, as one of the very first 
officers in the post-war period to experience that shift, was a transitional figure: an 
exceptionally intelligent, combat experienced officer who went on to become one of the most 
notable political-military officers of his generation.   However, understanding Goodpaster’s 
                                                 
5Specific senior leaders in the military, like Dwight Eisenhower, recognized the need for professionally 
developing young officers within a changing institutional paradigm.  For the “tapping” of junior officers, see 
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 145-148; for unconventional career paths, see 151-171. For the purposes of 
this thesis I define “political-military officer” as an officer whose unconventional career path includes a high 
degree of involvement in the political-military connection between strategy and policy described above in FN 3.  
See FN 120 for the army officer’s conventional career path. 
6
 See especially Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and 
Co., 1967), 185-187. 
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later and more significant career requires an examination of how he came to the attention of 
senior officers, which officers decided to mentor him, which officers he selected as role 
models, and what those choices meant for his career.   
By 1947, Andrew Goodpaster, a child of the Depression-era Midwest, had excelled at 
West Point, proven himself by the standards of his profession on the battlefield in Italy, 
helped shape the post-war world as a strategic planner, and secured the connections 
necessary to ensure continued advancement; through these experiences Goodpaster’s life and 
early career illustrate the making of a Cold War political-military officer.
 Childhood and the Depression
Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, Jr., called “Jack” by family and friends until his arrival 
at West Point in 1935, was born in February of 1915 in Granite City, Illinois, a small 
manufacturing town on the east bank of the Mississippi River just outside of St. Louis.7 With 
some 12,000 inhabitants at the time of Jack’s birth, the town had a large population of 
Eastern European immigrants, mainly Hungarian, but also Bulgarians, Poles, and Czechs.8  
The heart of Granite City’s economy was the industrial district by the river where the 
Graniteware factory, steel mills, and railway yards employed the majority of the working 
populace.9   
Goodpaster’s father, Andrew Sr., grew up in Indiana but relocated to Illinois in the 
first decade of the twentieth century as a railroad worker.10  He eventually became a 
conductor on the electric railway that ran from Alton, Illinois to St. Louis, where he met 
Theresa Mrovka, a second generation Polish-American seamstress who worked in the city.  
                                                 
7General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 1, File 1. 
8
 Granite City, A History of Granite City - Part Three: The Rise and Fall of a Powerhouse (1896 - 1956 A.D.), 
“Granite City, Illinois - Official Website,” 
http://www.granitecity.illinois.gov/wfapp?ACTION=Node&NodeID=83 
9
 Ibid. 
10Department of Commerce and Labor – Bureau of the Census, “Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910 – 
Population,” Series: T624, Roll: 310, pg. 285, 
http://persi.heritagequestonline.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/hqoweb/library/do/census/results/ (accessed 25 March 
2008).  
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Despite different backgrounds, they “took a shine to each other,” as Goodpaster later 
recalled, and settled in Granite City.11  
In 1922 the Goodpaster family, consisting of Andrew Sr., Theresa, Jack, his older 
brother Walter, and his baby sister Isla May, moved to the small town of Monrovia, Indiana, 
not far from where Andrew Sr. had grown up.  The family settled on a small farm there, “an 
80 acre plot of the finest soil in the world” with a small creek running through it.12  
Goodpaster’s father had always loved farming; he was quite good at it, and managed to get 
his first planting in that summer.   
The farm produced a good crop, but at the time market prices for grain dropped, so 
Goodpaster’s father left the family in Monrovia and headed north “to Ypsilanti, Michigan, 
where he would work on cars through the winter” at the automobile factory there. Andrew 
Sr.’s aunt, Lou Zouk, visited frequently to help with the children.  Goodpaster later recalled 
that his mother and great-aunt “would talk, almost in secret, away from us.  My guess is that 
it always had to do with my dad's sad initial childhood and why it is that he had to be raised 
by Aunt Lou.  They would talk, and I would often see my mother cry after those talks.”13 
 Goodpaster remembered his father as an “upright and righteous man” who strongly 
believed in individual responsibility and had a deep and abiding respect for the Bible, from 
which he read to his children.14  Goodpaster’s parents both worked hard to instill in their 
                                                 
11
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 1, File 1. 
12
“Andrew Goodpaster Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of Congress),” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/loc.natlib.afc2001001.29916, File 4.   
13
 “Andrew Goodpaster Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of Congress),” 
File 4. 
14
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Mandell, Kenneth, and  James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 1, File 1; Disc 3, File 1. 
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children a respect for others, and a sense of responsibility, but his father became the truly 
formative influence on young Jack.  He taught Jack and Walter basic farm chores and the 
necessity of paying close attention to detail.  On one occasion when he was six Jack helped 
Walter and his father plant the corn.  His father explained the importance of putting three 
grains of corn in each hole, but Jack was careless, and occasionally dropped more grains in.  
“When the corn finally sprouted, instead of having three shafts, which could grow strong, 
there were six shafts, that were going to do no good at all, and my father pointed it out to me, 
and it was a lesson that burned, and stayed, and still does.”15   
Theresa Goodpaster was the daughter of Polish-German immigrants, raised in 
Pennsylvania, and devoted to her family. Goodpaster later recalled that she was “close to 
being a saint in her devotion to others,” and a model for what he believed a person should be 
– thoughtful, kind, and considerate.  She stressed the importance of education, and made sure 
the children took their schoolwork seriously.  Both of his parents loved music, something 
Jack inherited and maintained for the rest of his life.16   
 After three years in Monrovia, the Goodpasters returned to Granite City, where 
Andrew Sr. accepted a position as the scheduling manager for the railroad.  Theresa also 
wanted to get the children into a larger school, which Monrovia, a town of about 300 people, 
did not have.  The family loaded up their Model-T Ford and headed back to Granite City, 
where they settled close to the center of town. They kept the farm in Indiana and rented it out 
to a married couple, traveling back and forth in the Model-T to help with the harvests.   
                                                 
15
 “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of 
Congress).” File 4.  The lesson was certainly a permanent one, as Goodpaster was 6 years old when it happened 
and 90 years old when he related it, with great clarity. 
16
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 3, File 1. 
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Jack and his older brother Walter, two years his senior, both did well in school, 
although Jack seemed to have a particular knack for learning and was twice bumped up a 
grade in the local school.17  His teachers were important influences on him.  He recalled his 
homeroom teacher in junior high school as “a martinet, but I had a lot of respect for her – she 
used to send me on errands all over the school, and when people asked her why, she said 
‘two words, dependability and responsibility.’”18 Jack demonstrated an aptitude for 
education, and as he passed into high school, he decided on a career in teaching.  The people 
of Granite City, in Goodpaster’s memory, took an “immigrant approach” to schooling, and 
were very serious about the value of education.19 Goodpaster remembered high school as “a 
grand experience.  I went out for football, never made the varsity, and was never likely to 
make it, but I enjoyed the rough and tumble.”20 Jack’s grades in high school reflected a 
particular talent in mathematics, but he also excelled in public speaking, “attracted to 
debating and the rigors of logic and evidence it required.”21 Selected to deliver an oration on 
Class Day, 28 May 1931, Goodpaster spoke on “Democracy: Its Challenges,” perhaps 
reflecting on the problems brought on by the Great Depression.22 
                                                 
17Ibid, Disc 1, File 1; “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American 
Folklife Center, Library of Congress),” File 4 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 3, File 1. 
20
 “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of 
Congress),” File 1. 
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Goodpaster’s report cards from High School, a copy of the commencement week program, and various papers 
from his high school career, Box 1, FF 1, AJG Collection 230.   
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The Depression hit Granite City during Jack’s junior year of high school.  Goodpaster 
recalled that, “It spread like wildfire.  Major plants closed down with 2 or 3 days notice, 
putting their workers out on the street.  Within a matter of 2 or 3 weeks there were men 
standing on the streets begging for food, especially food for their families.”23  His father 
suffered a one-half pay cut, but kept his job as a conductor, better off than many of the other 
men in town as the factories and steel plants shuttered their doors.  When Jack graduated in 
the spring of 1931, Granite City was effectively bankrupt, with no funds in the city coffers 
and a stagnant local economy.24  The Goodpasters relocated to East St. Louis; Jack prepared 
to depart for college at McKendree in Lebanon, Illinois, about twenty miles east of St. 
Louis.25   
Goodpaster’s desire to become a math teacher prompted his desire for college. 
Teaching at the time required two years of college, a limited teacher certificate and some 
practical experience, then a final two years at a university to receive an education degree.26  
Jack headed off to McKendree in the fall of 1931 with that goal in mind.  He did quite well 
academically in his first year.  He made friends easily, joined a fraternity, and was popular 
with the girls, many of whom kept in touch from high school.27  There was perhaps a hint of 
superiority in the tone of his correspondence as he moved beyond the realm of high school, 
                                                 
23
 “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of 
Congress),” File 1. 
24
 Granite City, A History of Granite City - Part Three: The Rise and Fall of a Powerhouse (1896 - 1956 A.D.), 
“Granite City, Illinois - Official Website.”   
25
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 1, File 2. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Letters from friends: Ethel, Marian, Ruthie, Lucille, and Elizabeth, Box 1, FFs 4&5, AJG Collection 230. 
10 
 
but it quickly dissipated by his sophomore year, perhaps spurred on by the growing financial 
strain of funding his education.28  Jack spent the summer between his freshman and 
sophomore years on the farm in Monrovia, working to “make tuition,” an effort that 
supported his second year at college.  His parents helped as much as their tight finances 
would allow.  Jack’s career at McKendree ended with his sophomore year when he ran out of 
money.  He finished with characteristically high grades, received a Limited Elementary 
certificate from St. Clair County to teach, and promptly found himself unemployed.  
Lacking the money for more college but hoping to find a teaching job to continue in 
his chosen vocation, Goodpaster applied across Illinois, but there were no positions available.  
He tried other routes. Knowing that the military academies offered tuition-free education in 
return for a term of service, he wrote to Congressmen and Senators seeking an appointment 
to West Point or the Naval Academy at Annapolis, but the earliest expected vacancy was 
1935.29  With nothing available in education in 1933, and little in other fields, Jack turned to 
the immediate need to assist the family financially.   
He moved back to East St. Louis with his parents and found work in a meatpacking 
plant, “washing barrels on a big piece of machinery.  The idea was to take the used barrel, 
turn it and thrust it into the turning machine.” He remembered that “it made an awful lot of 
noise, [and] I sang many of the songs that I knew and that have stayed with me over the 
                                                 
28
 Goodpaster’s McKendree Grade Reports for his freshman and sophomore years, Box 1, FF 2, AJG Collection 
230; Letter, McKendree President Cameron W. Harmon to Jack Goodpaster, 12 July 1932, inquiring if 
Goodpaster would be able to return due to tight finances,  Box 1, FF 4, AJG Collection 230. 
29
 Rejection letters for employment, E. St. Louis and Madison County school districts, and the Albert’s 
Teachers Agency in Chicago; Letter, Congressman Edwin Schaeffer,  May 1933; Letter, Congressman Walter 
Nesbit, Dec 1933 in response to Goodpaster’s requests for appointments to USMA and USNA, Box 1, FF 5, 
AJG Collection 230.  
11 
 
years, because the noise was such to drown out any noise I was making.”30 Located near the 
railroad yards and stockyards, the meatpacking plants of East St. Louis employed thousands 
of workers even in the Depression.  The work required little skill. It was occasionally 
dangerous, and labor-management relations were never particularly positive.31 Jack’s 
transition from college student and prospective teacher to laborer was a blow to Theresa 
Goodpaster. “My mother was very disappointed that I was back in what she called 'heavy 
shoes.'  She had hoped that her family could emerge from that but at the moment our whole 
aim was to sustain ourselves through this very, very difficult period.”32 Goodpaster joined 
Local 530 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen Union, and found 
himself elected president, most likely due to his education and public speaking skills, 
“though what it really amounted to was sitting as the chairman at some of their meetings,” a 
position he retained until early 1935.33  In January 1935, he was laid off in what he later 
termed a “reduction in forces.”34   
By the time Jack was let go his quest for more education bore fruit.  Hearing in early 
1934 that an appointment to West Point was available through competitive examination, he 
took the exam that summer.  Jack learned in November that he had secured the appointment.  
                                                 
30
 “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of 
Congress),” File 1. 
31
  Thomas Petraitis, “East St. Louis, Illinois: "Hog Capital of the Nation",” http://www.eco-
absence.org/esl/petraitis.htm;  See also “J. Ogden Armour Testifies”,  NY Times article, 17 February 1906, 
page 6; “Missouri Sues to Oust Packers”, NY Times article, 21 June 1910, page 5. 
32
 “Andrew Goodpaster Oral History Collection: Veterans History Project (American Folklife Center, Library of 
Congress),” File 1. 
33
 The work force were mostly recent immigrants from Eastern Europe—a smart local with some education and 
a similar family background was a logical choice. For further on the union, see David Brody, The Butcher 
Workmen: A Study of Unionization (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
34
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 1, File 2. 
12 
 
While waiting to depart for West Point, Goodpaster returned to work, finding a job pumping 
gas until the early summer.  Between working at the service station and preparing to depart 
for the east coast, Jack reviewed the brochure from West Point.   He knew West Point 
produced first-rate civil engineers and that many of its most famous graduates had been 
engineer officers.35  His aptitude for mathematics and an appreciation for practical problem 
solving suggested that he may find engineering rewarding.  In his review of the West Point 
literature, he noticed a statement declaring “the initial training will be rigorous,” but he had 
no real appreciation for how demanding West Point’s version of “rigorous” was.36
                                                 
35
 Ibid, Disc 1, Files 1&2; Disc 2, File 1.  
36
 Ibid, Disc 2, File 1.  
 West Point and the Making of an Officer
Goodpaster’s appointment to West Point reflected a demographic shift in officer 
recruiting during the Depression.37  Earlier, the ranks of the professional officer corps had 
been drawn from an “old family, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant [Episcopal], rural, upper-middle-
class professional background.”38  Goodpaster, raised both Methodist and Catholic, from an 
urban-industrial area, and whose maternal grandparents had emigrated to the United States in 
the late 19th century, did not fit the typical profile of a West Point cadet.  While his father’s 
position by the 1930s could be considered white-collar, the route to that position was 
certainly blue-collar.  Jack tried to attain white-collar respectability and security by becoming 
a teacher; stymied by the Depression, he turned to laboring work.   The Goodpaster family 
was probably better off than many other families in East St. Louis during the Depression.  
Andrew Sr. kept his job, the family still had their car and the farm in Indiana, and the 
children were either in school or employed. Nevertheless, the Goodpaster family was atypical 
by comparison to the background of most West Point cadets. Jack was by no means the first 
cadet with an irregular upbringing to attend the academy, but his selection by competitive 
exam reflected a gradual decline in the use of West Point appointments as a patronage tool 
                                                 
37
 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 89. Janowitz argued that “it took the great depression to transform the 
system.” 
38
 Ibid, 100. Further, Janowitz argued that for “the son of a less privileged family, coming from a background 
which was socially atypical, preparation for West Point or Annapolis could be the expression of great personal 
drive.” (112). 
14 
 
for local political machines.39  His decision to compete for the appointment and then attend 
West Point also revealed a degree of personal drive and ambition. 
Goodpaster traveled by train at the end of June 1935 with several other soon-to-be 
cadets to West Point.  Their instructions required them to report on “1 July 1935, not later 
than 11:00 a.m.,” and suggested that cadets “arrange for a hearty breakfast before reporting 
as the work immediately following admission is exacting.”40  Goodpaster later recalled it as 
an “understatement if I ever met one,” as the prospective cadets passed through a sally port 
into the crucible of what was called “beast barracks,” or cadet basic training.  The complete 
transition from citizen to apprentice officer was not as sudden, but for Goodpaster, reporting 
to the adjutant at West Point changed the course of his life in ways he could not possibly 
have imagined.  The “plebes” of the new fourth-class endured a long, hot summer learning 
how to care for personal equipment, march and conduct close order drill, and fire the rifle.41  
Beast barracks proved to be extremely demanding from the moment the new plebes arrived, 
but Goodpaster later recalled that they were “so glad to be there, they didn’t think twice 
about” doing what they were told.42  
Attrition in the class of 1939 revealed a slightly different reality. Between 1934 and 
1935 Congress expanded the Academy’s enrollment, from 1,378 to 1,964, an increase of 586, 
with no substantial increase in staff.  The addition meant Goodpaster’s class, at 708, was far 
                                                 
39
 Notably, Dwight Eisenhower came from a blue collar, Mennonite background and also won his appointment 
by competitive exam.   
40
“Instructions for cadet candidates authorized to report for admission to the United States Military Academy,” 
Box 1, FF 7, AJG Collection 230.   
41
 West Point cadets were designated by classes.  Fourth-class was equivalent to freshman, third-class to 
sophomore, and so on. 
42
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 2, File 1. 
15 
 
larger than any before.  Within the first year, 179 were “discharged for deficiency,” another 
33 resigned, and 8 more were removed for conduct or disability, for a total of 220 cadets who 
did not continue into their second year.  Of the total, 112 of the “deficient” cadets received 
their discharges in January 1936, and the rest were gone by the beginning of summer.43  
Goodpaster not only endured the routine harassment of that first summer but thrived, 
demonstrating a certain strength of character and intellect. While the Academy incorporated 
both technical training and traditional academics in its inclusive course of study, academic 
deficiency proved the most common route to dismissal.44  Success in the classroom opened 
doors that exceptional marksmanship could not. 
Goodpaster understood that a West Point education required a four year commitment 
of active service in the army.  Impressed by the Army Corps of Engineers and its civil 
engineering tradition, he wanted to serve as an engineer officer.  Goodpaster entered the 
Academy lacking the intention of a lifetime of service in the army, but the initial experience 
did instill a respect for the values of service and responsibility.  Two years at McKendree 
prepared him academically and his labor and farm experience prepared him for the physical 
demands of soldiering.45  Goodpaster was primed by character, education, and experience to 
excel at the military academy – and he did. 
                                                 
43
 William D. Conner, "Annual Report of the Superintendent,"  (West Point: United States Military Academy, 
1935), 3;  William D. Connor, "Annual Report of the Superintendent,"  (West Point: United States Military 
Academy, 1936), 1-2; Jay L. Benedict, "Annual Report of the Superintendent,"  (West Point: United States 
Military Academy, 1939), 7. 
44
 Historically, Academy attrition rates reflected academic deficiency as a leading cause of dismissal.  The class 
of 1939 was not exceptional in that respect, just in the percentage dismissed.   
45
 Form 315 (Employment History),  Box 1, FF 7, AJG Collection 230. By the time Goodpaster entered the 
academy he was 6’2” and 175 lbs. 
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Those advantages were also helpful in surviving the harassment fourth-class cadets 
endured.  He was twenty when he entered the Academy, a year or more older than his peers, 
and the screaming of petty tyrants on the parade ground was most likely not as shocking an 
experience as laboring in an industrial slaughterhouse.  His academic prowess earned him 
some free time to explore other facets of an academy education, but also some animosity 
from less capable classmates, who remained mired in their studies.  Goodpaster joined the 
cadet choir and glee club, went out for football, and joined the debate team.  Even with these 
extra-curricular activities, he maintained high grades, reflecting a dedication to academic 
achievement reminiscent of his earlier success at McKendree.46 
A major inducement for Goodpaster’s academic performance was the Academy’s 
system of “branching” officers.  Cadets selected the branch of the army (infantry, artillery, 
engineers, quartermaster, and the like) they wanted to serve in by class rank, which meant a 
lower ranking reduced the likelihood of gaining their branch choice.   Additionally, branches 
had limited vacancies each year.  Traditionally, the top graduates of the Academy selected 
the elite engineer branch, reflecting the academy’s original mission of training artillerists and 
engineers.47  Goodpaster knew that the route to the engineers led through the classroom, and 
applied himself accordingly. By the end of a demanding first semester, he had achieved a 
high standing on the academic rolls but the initial experience “plunged [him] into a ‘storm’ 
that makes any memory of that time a formless blur in my mind.”48   
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The winter break, when all cadets except the fourth-class and “deficient” upper 
classmen took holiday leave, was a defining point in Goodpaster’s life.  West Point in winter 
was depressing; the school overlooked the frigid Hudson River, exposed to biting winds and 
the grey stone of the buildings matched the leaden sky.  With the majority of the cadets gone, 
the unfortunate remaining upperclassmen turned to the fourth-class to facilitate their limited 
opportunities for entertainment.  At the time, West Point held organized “cadet hops,” or 
dances, which girls from the surrounding area attended.  Fourth-class cadets, with significant 
restrictions on their freedom and time, were rarely allowed such liberty, but during the winter 
break of 1935, they were permitted to attend, most likely to provide a sufficient number of 
cadets to make the events worthwhile.49 During a hop over that winter break, an 
upperclassman, Trevor Dupuy, allowed Goodpaster to dance with his date, Dorothy 
Anderson.50  Nicknamed “Dossy” because her little brother could not pronounce “Dorothy,” 
she was the daughter of Lieutenant Colonel John Waverly Anderson, the executive officer for 
the Superintendent, a figure high in the pantheon of senior officers at the academy.51  
Goodpaster’s fourth-class status prevented him from seeing her again until the long-suffering 
fourth-class was “recognized” during graduation week in the late spring.  After the first-class 
graduated, the fourth-class cadets received official recognition as the new third-class, and 
gained more personal freedom. On 11 July 1936, Goodpaster, a sophomore (or “yearling” in 
academy parlance), escorted Dossy to a hop.  He was smitten, and later recalled “I knew that 
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was where my commitment would be made.”52 Goodpaster and another cadet vied for Dossy 
Anderson’s attention, but Goodpaster had acquired a relatively paltry forty-four demerits 
over the course of his first year, while the other cadet had more.  Demerits required 
punishment tours and left little time for dating.53 
West Point maintained a demanding disciplinary system, but cadet-imposed informal 
discipline could be much harsher. While hazing was forbidden, rigorous “training” punished 
those who failed to conform.  Perhaps the worst case during Goodpaster’s tenure at West 
Point was the racially motivated “silencing” of black cadet Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. in the 
class of 1936.  Davis, ostracized by the Corps of Cadets for the entire four years he spent at 
the Academy, provided an extreme example of the pressure to conform to cadet standards.54  
Goodpaster certainly knew of the discrimination against Davis, although the Academy’s class 
system effectively separated Davis from the cadets in other classes.  Goodpaster’s generally 
amiable disposition enabled him to handle most of the cadet disciplinary issues with 
equanimity.  West Point discipline rarely targeted individuals who conformed to its standards 
and expectations, and by the end of his first year, Goodpaster emerged a model cadet.  He 
ended the first year ranked second in his class academically, behind his friend Stanley 
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Dziuban, a position he never relinquished over the next three years.  Goodpaster excelled in 
both math and English, did well in both military drawing and tactics, and received his 
academic stars (uniform insignia worn on the collar as visible indicators of academic 
prowess) in June 1936.55   
West Point summers were not free time for cadets, so Goodpaster and his classmates 
embarked on a summer training schedule that included field maneuvers, encampments, and 
equestrian training.  Working with horses and cavalry sabers conveyed to the cadets that the 
army they were preparing to join was not a fully modernized force, despite the adoption of 
the airplane and tank.56  The academy cadre planned the summer training programs for the 
cadets, incorporating progressively more advanced instruction in the army’s organization, 
tactics, and weapon systems.  Cadets traveled to different army posts around the country and 
learned infantry tactics in Georgia, artillery and anti-aircraft systems in Virginia, and basic 
aviation skills at nearby Stewart Field.  The training, both in the summer and throughout the 
academic year, relied heavily on cadet leadership with cadre supervision.   
The “yearling,” or third-class, provided a pool of personnel for the selection of cadet 
leaders, once their completion of a year at the academy made them available to assist in 
running the Corps of Cadets.  Yearlings were eligible for corporal rank, the second-class for 
sergeant stripes, and the first-class formed the cadet officer ranks.  The limited positions 
meant that only the most promising cadets received the opportunities, and responsibilities, 
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associated with leadership.  Indeed, at the time a cadet could complete an Academy 
education without ever holding a leadership role within the Corps of Cadets.  Those selected 
for leadership positions were the ones the tactical officers thought capable of wielding 
limited authority, and who had demonstrated some leadership ability.  In the summer of 
1935, Goodpaster’s selection as a cadet corporal served as the first indicator from the tactical 
officers that they perceived some leadership potential in him.   
The second year at West Point went much as Goodpaster’s first, but with fewer 
demerits, slightly better grades, and more time spent with Dossy Anderson.  He remained 
second in the class, with former roommate Stan Dziuban always a small step ahead.  
Goodpaster participated in more extra-curricular activities, particularly the debate team and 
the choir, which performed in New York and other cities.  Although he later described 
himself as a “dignified and austere fellow,” in reality he had a lively sense of humor, and 
managed to earn five demerits and ten confinements for throwing a pie plate in the mess 
hall.57  Similarly, when the commander of the West Point band induced Goodpaster to 
demonstrate his singing ability in the mess hall one day, he performed the “Wandering 
Minstrel” from Gilbert & Sullivan’s comic opera “The Mikado,” then followed with 
“Titwillow,” a performance that earned him that enduring nickname among his classmates.58        
 Goodpaster made friends easily, was amiable and courteous but typically avoided the 
limelight. His best friend and roommate for all four years at West Point was Thomas 
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Jonathan Jackson Christian, the grandson of Civil War general “Stonewall” Jackson.59  
Goodpaster, Christian, and the other cadets experienced what he described as “learning 
leadership by osmosis” through the cadet leadership system with an “atmosphere of a 
particular calling, or sense of service.”60 Goodpaster recalled the challenges of cadet life as 
part of the gradual process that tactical officers used to inculcate leadership and 
responsibility, a part of a deliberate program to ready cadets for “a lifetime of service.”61  He 
certainly did not see it that way all the time, and undoubtedly had some hard days at times, 
but his grades never faltered, and he rarely earned demerits. 
In the spring of 1937, Goodpaster’s routine experienced a series of interruptions. The 
first was particularly unwelcome, as Dossy Anderson moved to Newport, RI, where her 
father attended the Naval War College.  She continued to visit Goodpaster at West Point, 
arriving by train and staying with friends on the weekends.  In late spring 1937, Goodpaster, 
Dziuban, and eighteen other cadets interviewed for six positions on what was called “the 
battleship cruise,” a naval academy program which took midshipmen and six cadets on a 
summer training cruise to Europe.  The trip would last three months, but promised an 
adventure overseas, an opportunity to see how the navy operated, and a break from the 
academy routine.62   
In early June 1937 both Goodpaster and Stan Dziuban won positions on the cruise 
and sailed for Europe on the battleship New York.  In Germany the six West Point cadets 
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received full liberty and authority to travel.63  In Hamburg they met with the army attaché, 
Truman Smith, who advised Goodpaster, “young man, look around you—this is a country 
going to war.”64  Goodpaster recalled, “As we traveled through Germany in those three 
weeks, we saw uniforms everywhere, and we saw a militarizing society, and that had a very 
profound effect on us, because we knew Hitler was calling for an adjustment to the Versailles 
Treaty.”65  In their first two years at the Academy, the cadets had been aware of the war in 
China, and Japan’s expansive ambitions, while Hitler’s growing assertiveness seemed to 
threaten European stability.  The instructors at West Point believed that war in Europe was 
not far off, and that eventually the United States would be drawn into it.  For Goodpaster and 
his friends, “we had this sense that the world was headed to war—it was a sobering 
thought.”66  The end of the 1937 battleship cruise brought the West Point cadets back to the 
grey stone fortress overlooking the Hudson, and Goodpaster returned to the academy, where 
he passed his third year with his customary high marks and low demerits.67   
The routine in the Academy contrasted sharply with the international upheaval in the 
wider world, however, and both cadets and faculty were alert to the increased global 
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tensions, where the “resort to force was very much in evidence.”68  The cadets discussed the 
situation in Europe often, though they tended to view any coming conflict from a personal 
viewpoint—prospective pilots emphasized the role of airpower, future infantry officers the 
role of the ground forces, and the like.69   
In May, 1938 the Commandant of Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Ryder, 
selected Goodpaster as the Regimental Adjutant, one of six Cadet Captains in the Corps of 
Cadets.  The Commandant, the officer in charge of cadet military training and daily 
activities, selected the leaders of the new first-class during graduation week.   While 
academic performance typically had more impact on cadets, “military efficiency and 
conduct” also provided benchmarks for the Academy cadre, especially in the selection of 
cadet officers, those first-class cadets responsible for the leadership of the Corps.70  Cadets 
lived in an environment of almost continual evaluation in both the classroom and in military 
training.  Assignment as an officer in the Corps, especially as a Cadet Captain, meant the 
Academy cadre considered the appointee as one of the most promising leaders in the Corps.  
Leadership positions did not depend on academic ability.  In fact, during Goodpaster’s first-
class year, he and his roommate, Thomas Christian, both served as Cadet Captains; at the 
time Goodpaster ranked second academically and Christian eighty-first.  Stanley Dziuban, 
academically first in the class, received an assignment as a cadet lieutenant, ranked fifteenth 
in military efficiency.  Tom Smith, the First Captain, or highest leadership position in the 
Corps, ranked two-hundred and ninety-second academically. Goodpaster’s achievement of 
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both high academic standing and an important leadership role demonstrated his exceptional 
ability both in the classroom and in military training.  It also meant that Goodpaster was 
probably the most well rounded cadet in the class of 1939.   
In the fall of 1938, Goodpaster’s academic credentials and public speaking ability, 
honed by years on the debate team, led Colonel Herman Beukema, head of the Department of 
Economics, Government, and History, to select him as West Point’s representative to the 
Council on Foreign Relations Conference.  Beukema chose Goodpaster at the suggestion of 
First Lieutenant George “Abe” Lincoln, Goodpaster’s debate coach and an instructor and 
acting assistant professor in the department.71  Goodpaster took a period of instruction and 
directed reading overseen by Lincoln before attending the conference. 
The conference focused on American foreign policy and the Neutrality Act of 1937, 
the third of four Neutrality Acts passed in the 1930s that restricted the president’s control of 
American foreign policy.  Largely the work of isolationist politicians, the Act of 1937 barred 
American shipment of arms or war material to the belligerent parties of any war.72  It also 
prohibited loans or credits to belligerents and proved an inflexible tool for American foreign 
policy.  Participants at the conference included members of the State Department, 
businessmen, lawyers, and academics—people Goodpaster described afterwards as “men of 
considerable ability.”73  Students from leading universities also participated.  The three day 
conference produced three perspectives on American neutrality, with advocates for each. One 
group argued for isolationism and protracted neutrality as traditional American policy, while 
                                                 
71
 Colonel Beukema served as the head of the Department of Economics, Government, and History at West 
Point from 1930 until 1954, when he was replaced by Colonel George A. Lincoln. 
72
 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2008), 504-517. 
 
73
 Goodpaster’s report for 1LT Lincoln & COL Beukema, undated, Box 2, FF 3, AJG Collection 230.   
25 
 
others countered that neutrality should be abandoned and the U.S. should declare its support 
for the Western Powers.  Goodpaster’s group advocated a lifting of neutrality without a 
commitment to any other party, so as to maintain “freedom of action” in foreign policy.   
His report to Colonel Beukema and Lieutenant Lincoln after the conference contained 
a brief synopsis of events, along with some words of advice for future participants. “Try not 
to speak too much or too often, but let the others do most of the talking.  Pull them gently 
back into line when they get too far off base.  When you take a position on an issue or 
present a conviction, keep it sober and down-to-earth. Try to keep a ‘mobile reserve’ of ideas 
in mind.  Don’t ever talk till you exhaust them.”74  He recommended that future cadet 
participants “watch [the guest speakers] and pick up on their methods.  Note that everything 
they say has a clear purpose—a conclusion to be drawn.”75  The conference served as 
Goodpaster’s introduction to serious foreign policy discussion outside the constraints of the 
debate team or the classroom; his performance elicited the respect of other participants and 
the panel members, who asked him to prepare the position paper for his group.  Goodpaster’s 
report to Lincoln and Beukema revealed not only a mature appreciation for policy debate, but 
perceptive insight on how to best communicate his ideas.  Lincoln later used some of 
Goodpaster’s ideas in a paper for the Council on Foreign Affairs Instructor’s Conference.76  
Goodpaster’s performance at the conference almost certainly encouraged Lincoln and 
Beukema to keep track of the cadet after graduation.  At the time, West Point professors 
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routinely noted the best performing cadets in their fields and sought to have them reassigned 
to the Academy after a period of service in the line army.  
  Despite Goodpaster’s involvement with what was still an extra-curricular 
commitment, his grades never faltered, and in the fall of 1938, with the other 455 cadets 
remaining in the first class, he chose his branch of service.  He and the other cadets in the top 
fifty academic rankings chose the engineers, at the time the army’s elite branch, which left 
only a choice of duty stations to determine their initial assignments.  Class rank also 
determined the selection process for duty stations, yet another factor to motivate cadets in 
their studies. 
Goodpaster and Dossy Anderson, by then firmly set on marriage immediately 
following graduation, wanted an assignment to the Philippines.  Overseas assignments like 
the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama offered not only better opportunities for advancement, 
but also better training due to their larger garrisons.77  To Goodpaster’s disappointment the 
only lieutenant position in the engineer regiment in the Philippines was filled so he opted for 
the Panama Canal Zone instead.78  He and the rest of the class of 1939 graduated on 12 June, 
received their diplomas from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and departed the Academy as 
second lieutenants.79   
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For Andrew Goodpaster, the four years at West Point proved a truly transformative 
period.  He originally viewed the Academy as an escape from the Depression, and an 
opportunity to continue his education, but after four years of exposure to West Point he had 
instead found a new calling.  The Academy’s emphasis on tradition and individual 
responsibility resonated with Goodpaster and reinforced the values his parents had instilled in 
him.  In this way the Academy succeeded in its mission to inculcate cadets with a sense of 
responsibility and commitment to service. West Point accomplished that task by enforcing a 
highly normative lifestyle with both official and unofficial codes of conduct.  While some 
cadets expressed their individuality by flaunting regulations and walking a thin line between 
discipline and dismissal, others, like Goodpaster, chose to conform to the established 
standards and excel within their constraints.80 Goodpaster’s success was not only due to his 
natural intelligence, ambition, and character, although these were critically important.  His 
relationship with Dossy Anderson almost certainly helped him, although he may have been 
only dimly aware of it at the time. He was a topic of conversation in the Anderson house, and 
most likely between Colonel Anderson and other officers at the academy.  Such discussion 
would have widened the circle of senior officers aware of Goodpaster’s potential.  Also, his 
relationship with Dossy helped to acculturate him to the social aspects of the officer corps.  
He spent his limited free time visiting at the Anderson home, and thereby gained both from 
Dossy’s company and her family’s social environment.  All of these aspects of Academy life 
helped to shape Andrew Goodpaster over the course of his four years at West Point, and he 
emerged as an intelligent, ambitious young lieutenant, excited about his prospects in the 
military service, somewhat concerned for the state of international affairs, but generally quite 
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happy with his choice of a military career.   There is no way he could have known at that 
early stage just what that career was going to mean for himself, his family, or the nation.81   
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 World War Two and the Testing of an Officer
Goodpaster and Dossy married on August 28, 1939. They departed on a honeymoon 
drive to Illinois to visit his family just before Germany invaded Poland.82  After their brief 
honeymoon they left the United States on an army transport ship in September, arriving in 
Panama in the first week of October 1939.83   
Goodpaster reported to the 11th Engineer Regiment at Fort Clayton in the Panama 
Canal Zone.  He secured quarters for himself and Dossy and was immediately sent off on his 
first mission as an engineer lieutenant, serving as the officer in charge of new recruit training.  
Goodpaster and a “spiffy and spoony” non-commissioned officer (NCO) spent six weeks at a 
cantonment teaching the newly arrived engineer enlisted men the inner workings of the 
engineer trade.84 In 1939 there were no Officer Basic Courses to teach the fundamentals of 
each branch to new officers, an education that their first unit had to provide.  Assigning 
newly commissioned lieutenants to supervise recruit training was one way of doing so, as the 
officer became proficient by observing and participating in the training.  While Goodpaster 
was technically in charge of the training, in reality he was as much a student as the rest of the 
men.  He knew it, as did the NCO, who never let on that he was in fact teaching the young 
officer the basics of military engineering.  Army engineer units performed a wide range of 
                                                 
82
 Ibid., Disc 3, File 2; Honeymoon planning notes, AJG Collection 230, Box 3, FF 1.  
83
 General Andrew Goodpaster, Kenneth Mandell, and James H. McCall, “Interviews with General Andrew 
Goodpaster,” Box 11, AJG Collection 231-A, Disc 3, File 2; Disc 4, File 1. 
84
 Ibid., “Spiffy and Spoony” described an individual who’s uniform and military bearing were admirable.  
Goodpaster’s impression of the NCO was that of an ‘old-Army,’ long-service NCO.   
30 
 
construction duties, from framing and finishing buildings to constructing bridges, roads, and 
airfields.  They also had responsibilities as combat engineers for clearing minefields, 
repairing bridges and roads under fire, and ensuring the army’s mobility in the attack.  
Goodpaster learned more than just how to build structures and defensive positions; he took 
from the experience a profound respect for the knowledge and professionalism of long 
service NCOs. While he was exposed to NCOs at West Point and received instruction on 
how officers and NCOs were supposed to interact, the experience of working with NCOs in 
the “real army,” away from the confines of West Point and focused on practical problem 
solving was a part of any officer’s training.85   
Upon reporting to the regiment’s headquarters in the spring of 1940, Goodpaster 
found that his position as a new lieutenant and former cadet adjutant made him the primary 
candidate to serve as the regimental adjutant: the overworked, under-appreciated, and 
generally much maligned assistant to the commander, and master of all paperwork.86  Once 
into the position in May 1940, he made the most of the long hours and acquired the skills of 
preparing and managing the regiment’s paperwork as well as handling personnel 
assignments.   
After a year learning the inner workings of the regiment first hand Goodpaster 
rejoined Company A, 11th Engineers as a platoon leader, where he became absorbed in a 
sequence of projects involving road and bridge construction, as well as airfield expansion and 
improvement.  He participated in a number of engineer reconnaissance projects, prepared 
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estimates for construction jobs, and in general went about learning as much as he could about 
military engineering and command.  Meanwhile, the demand for engineers in the Canal Zone 
continued to increase as the U.S. military buildup overtaxed the capacity of the existing 
facilities.87  
Between the beginning of 1939 and the spring of 1941, the army garrison in the Canal 
Zone grew from 13,500 men to over 21,000, an expansion indicative of the strategic 
importance of the Panama Canal, the fastest and safest method for civilian shipping and 
naval vessels transiting between the Atlantic and Pacific.88  The influx of units into the Canal 
Zone busied Goodpaster and his men with building temporary barracks, mess halls, latrines, 
and offices.  They also worked on airfields, lengthening runways and building aircraft 
revetments.  The intense construction and growth provided Goodpaster with on-the-job 
training and an extensive education in engineering skills.   
 By the fall of 1941, Goodpaster’s technical competence and leadership ability were 
cause for Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Frech to give him command of Company E, 11th 
Engineers.  Goodpaster was still a first lieutenant at the time, while company commands 
were normally held by a captain. Frech most likely lacked experienced officers, as more 
senior officers returned to the United States to supervise the new engineer units forming as 
part of the general troop build-up then underway.89  
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While command of a company imposed new demands and long hours, it was another 
learning experience. Goodpaster found himself involved in such disparate activities as 
counseling junior officers on financial failings, sitting as a board member for a court-martial 
of an officer, investigating a soldier’s death in an accident, and reorganizing the Regimental 
Motor Pool.   Yet the Goodpasters continued to enjoy a peacetime social life, making friends 
on the post at Fort Clayton, and seeing former classmates stationed there.90  On the afternoon 
of 7 December 1941, Goodpaster and Dossy were golfing on the Fort Clayton course when 
one of their friends called them over to his house by the fairway to report the Pearl Harbor 
attack.  Goodpaster’s first reaction to the radio report was, “that it was some kind of Orson 
Welles thing,” referring to the famous radio show broadcast of War of the Worlds in October 
of 1938 that had spawned a scare among many Americans because of its news-bulletin 
format.91  He soon realized it was no hoax, and within minutes the post was on alert to repel 
an expected attack from the Pacific side of the Isthmus.  
 Company E received its orders that night: to construct a cantonment to inter Japanese 
civilians in the Canal Zone, who had been rounded up during the day and confined in the 
Panama City jail.  The company headed out to the appointed site near the Atlantic mouth of 
the Canal.  The initial instructions were to build for 250 inhabitants, which then became 750, 
and within a week, 1800, as Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S. and the internment 
camps were expanded accordingly.  The engineers used the internees to help build the camps; 
Goodpaster later recalled that they seemed to prefer construction work to sitting in the jail in 
Panama City.  After the first camp was done Company E built a second some thirty miles 
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away.  The interred civilians spent several months in the camps before being shipped to the 
U.S.92  
 The Canal Zone remained tense, and newspapers carried stories of Japanese aircraft 
carrier sightings on the horizon. Perimeter guards fired at shadows while rumors of sabotage 
rings prompted ever tighter security around the canal and locks.  After two months on alert 
the engineers began training new engineer companies for airfield construction.  Speed and 
resourcefulness were the key requirements for engineer officers as the pace of construction 
was unrelenting.  In addition to the press of construction, Goodpaster also had to manage the 
evacuation of civilians and family members, including Dossy.  She stayed as long as she 
could, while larger families were shipped home, but eventually the order came, and she left 
Panama in May 1942, four and a half months pregnant.93 
 After Dossy’s departure, Goodpaster, recently promoted to captain, devoted most of 
his time to one construction project after another.  In the evenings he studied tactics using 
books from the library, particularly General George C. Marshall’s edited work, Infantry in 
Battle, a book designed to get officers to think pragmatically about tactics.  The engineer 
regiment reinforced Goodpaster’s study program by initiating a series of classes, practical 
exercises, and tests, focused on the secondary role of combat engineers as infantry.94  It was 
an education Goodpaster later put to good use in Italy.  
 By late summer 1942 tensions eased in the Canal Zone. New radar stations, defensive 
emplacements, and the troop buildup diminished the likelihood of attack.  Goodpaster 
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requested leave to return home for the birth of his child in September.  He had voluntarily 
extended his overseas tour in Panama prior to the outbreak of war and had not taken leave in 
over thirty-four months.95  The regimental commander instead re-assigned Goodpaster to the 
newly formed 390th Engineer Regiment at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, which allowed 
Goodpaster to return to the states, take leave and see Dossy, and then remain stateside for at 
least a brief period.96   
 Goodpaster left the Canal Zone at the end of August 1942, and en route to his new 
duty station, visited with Dossy and his first child, Susan.  On reporting to Camp Claiborne at 
the end of September he became the executive officer (XO) of the 390th Engineer Regiment 
and received a promotion to major less than a month later.97  Except for Goodpaster and the 
regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Winslow, every other officer in the 
outfit was a Second Lieutenant.98 The inexperience of the unit’s officer complement was a 
stark indicator of the rapid and massive army expansion, so accelerated by 1942 that cadets 
were graduated early from West Point, and civilians with college degrees or simply officer 
“aptitude” rushed through officer training courses.99    
The 390th was a shock for Goodpaster for another reason. It was organized as an all 
black outfit, but a lack of black officers meant the officers were all white, with black enlisted 
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men and NCOs.  The bulk of the junior enlisted men came from the South, the officers from 
both the north and the south, and the majority of the NCOs from the north.  Friction between 
the northern NCOs and the southern enlisted men increased command problems, occasionally 
exacerbated by white officers who embraced the Jim Crow regulations on post.100 
Goodpaster was not naïve about the nature of the segregated army; if nothing else, Benjamin 
O. Davis, Jr.’s experience at West Point had revealed the prejudice within the officer corps. 
His experience in Louisiana, however, was marked by a realization of the dangerous nature 
of race relations in the South, exemplified in the regimental commander’s refusal to allow the 
enlisted men to go into town without the regiment’s own military police as escorts to prevent 
incidents with the local whites. 
 In February 1943, Goodpaster departed for the Command and General Staff School at 
Fort Leavenworth in Kansas for the “requisite training for divisional command and General 
Staff positions.”101 The abbreviated nine week course distilled the essential lessons of the 
pre-war nine month school.  Halfway through the course, he received orders reassigning him 
to the newly formed 48th Engineer Battalion (Combat), part of the 1108th Engineer Group, at 
Camp Gruber Oklahoma.102  Goodpaster’s tenure in the 390th thus lasted only four months, 
but the experience soured him on segregation for the remainder of his life.103   
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 Upon graduating from the Staff School, Goodpaster proceeded to join the 48th “in the 
maneuver area,” a large part of northern Louisiana used for field training exercises.104  When 
he arrived in April he assumed command of the battalion and thereafter concentrated on 
preparing it for combat, as the 48th was scheduled for deployment overseas.105   The battalion 
participated in a series of exercises, including one in which Goodpaster was captured while 
conducting a reconnaissance forward of the front line.106  He was generally pleased with the 
battalion’s performance.  It was a new unit, leavened with some long service NCOs, and the 
men were happy to get a West Pointer in command.107 While it may seem counter-intuitive 
that the men would be happy at that, the 48th Engineers were extremely short of experienced 
and qualified officers, so getting an Academy graduate with some command experience may 
have served to bolster unit morale and confidence. As the battalion prepared to leave 
Oklahoma, its destination changed.  The original plan for deployment had the 48th assigned 
to the United Kingdom, where they were to meet their equipment and participate in the cross-
channel invasion of France.  Instead, a change in American strategy diverted many units, 
including the 48th Engineers, to the Mediterranean.   
The Allied decision to postpone the invasion of France, made at a strategy conference 
in May 1943, created military and political problems for the Western Allies.  The Soviet 
Union, hard pressed by German advances, continued to insist that the Allies open a “Western 
Front” to force Germany to split its forces.  The British advocated an invasion of Italy to 
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remove that country from the war as soon as possible, while American planners sought a 
cross-Channel invasion of France as the quickest way to end the war in Europe.  The two 
parties finally agreed to an invasion of Sicily in the summer of 1943 with a further invasion 
of Italy at the discretion of the theater commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
American strategists also secured a firm commitment from the British for an invasion of 
France in the spring of 1944.   In the meantime, the strategic investment in an Italian 
campaign required the diversion of units, including the 48th Engineers, to the Mediterranean 
Theater of Operations.108  
 
The battalion left Camp Gruber, Oklahoma for the East Coast, where the men 
boarded ships for Africa.  Upon arrival, the battalion began an intensive training period to 
prepare for combat in Italy, including operating a British mobile bridging system that they 
later used to great effect in Italy.  They practiced working at night to avoid being targeted by 
German artillery and refreshed their training on laying and removing mines.   
On arrival at Naples in September, Goodpaster’s unit joined the U.S. VI Corps, and 
continued training.  First combat came at the Volturno River north of Naples, where the 
battalion laid a pontoon bridge for the French Expeditionary Force.  There came the first 
casualties, a sobering event for Goodpaster, who always visited the wounded every Sunday 
in the hospital, a practice that “hit harder in a way than when [he] had heard a troop had been 
killed.”109  Through the fall of 1943, the 48th supported the VI Corps’s approach to Monte 
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Cassino, a town at the entrance to the Liri Valley and the best route to Rome.  Strong German 
defensive positions, part of the “Gustav Line,” blocked the Allied advance north, and the 
terrain and weather combined to make the fighting particularly brutal.110  The battalion’s 
mission, to maintain the road network and bridges in the VI Corps area, proved difficult 
because of frequent rain and flooding.   
In November 1943, Fifth Army transferred Goodpaster’s battalion to II Corps.  Their 
first task was to turn a five-mile stretch of railroad track into a tank road.  The Germans 
destroyed the main roads as they retreated up the peninsula, forcing engineer units like 
Goodpaster’s to improvise routes for tanks and trucks to get to the front lines.111 The 
battalion completed the mission in less than two weeks, under heavy shelling and occasional 
air raids.  Goodpaster’s executive officer was evacuated after his jeep was strafed by a 
German fighter, forcing Goodpaster to operate without an XO for a brief period.  Completing 
the road required his entire unit and more than a dozen separate bridging operations, mostly 
conducted at night to avoid German artillery.  “It was there that the grit and guts of men like 
Col. Goodpaster and CPT Van Campen inspired us,” one NCO remembered.112 The 
mountainous terrain favored the defense, allowing the Germans to prepare effective positions 
and pre-register their artillery. Under observation from the high ground, working in the open 
became exceedingly dangerous for the Americans.   
Following the completion of the tank road, the battalion joined an armored infantry 
task force in the drive to take Mount Porchia, one of the last pieces of significant terrain 
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before Monte Cassino.113  On 6 January 1944, the task force commander committed the 
battalion as infantry on the left flank of Mt. Porchia, while the 6th Armored Infantry struggled 
to take and hold the high ground.114  The task force’s left flank came unhinged and the 48th 
was the only available unit to fill the gap.  The task force commander’s call to the 1108th 
Engineer Group that evening indicated the ferocity of the fighting, as he was “sorry he must 
commit the 48th Engineers as infantry because they are the best damned engineers [he had] 
seen.”115 The fighting was intense, and casualties were high.  Wounded early in the fight, 
Goodpaster helped one of the infantry battalion commanders organize the defense, and then 
assisted in evacuating the other commander when he was struck in the head by mortar fire.  
The battalion held for two days and three nights against German counter-attacks, and 
received the Presidential Unit citation for its actions.  The intensity of the fighting was 
reflected in the high awards for valor: one Medal of Honor, three Distinguished Service 
Crosses, twenty-one Silver Stars (one of which was Goodpaster); and two Bronze Stars.116  
Goodpaster’s self-study of infantry tactics, begun in Panama, paid off on the slopes of Mt. 
Porchia. 
The battalion pulled back for two days following the fight at Porchia, then went into 
action again on the approach to Monte Cassino, the lynchpin of “the Gustav Line” at the 
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mouth of the Liri Valley. From 20-22 January 1944, the 36th Infantry Division attempted to 
assault across the Rapido River, but took over 1600 casualties with no success.   The II Corps 
continued in the attack, attempting to cross farther north on the Rapido.  The sodden plains 
around the river bogged down both men and tanks in thick mud under continuous observation 
and fire from German positions on the far side of the river.  The long and difficult approaches 
to the river forced the engineers to construct a series of “corduroy” roads over the marsh, but 
the tanks destroyed the corduroys and the attack remained stalled south of the river.117  
In the early hours of 29 January 1944, General Charles Ryder, commander of the 34th 
Infantry Division, told Goodpaster, then the acting commander for the 1108th Engineer 
Group, to find a way to get tanks across the river.  Ryder was the Commandant of Cadets 
who had selected Goodpaster as a Cadet Captain only five years earlier.  The Germans had 
destroyed a bridge over the Rapido northeast of Cassino and used the rubble to divert the 
watercourse, thereby flooding the approaches to the town.  Goodpaster and some of his 
officers, knowing the corduroy roads would be a gamble for tanks, planned to use the 
riverbed south of where the Germans had diverted the river as a tank crossing.  The planned 
route was some 1500 yards long from the entrance by the destroyed bridge to the exit, an 
embankment immediately north of Cassino.  The officers set out before first light to prepare 
the crossing.  A foot reconnaissance found it passable for tanks.  A team of engineers used 
explosive charges to clear debris from the riverbed as Goodpaster took others the length of 
the route, clearing anti-tank mines as they went.  While Goodpaster had been captured 
conducting a similar reconnaissance when training in Louisiana, on this occasion he returned 
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safely to U.S. lines, found the 756th Tank Battalion, and led it down the route.  Driven by a 
sense of personal responsibility for his plan and committed to its success, Goodpaster’s clear-
headed command of the operation proved decisive.  Combined with a measure of individual 
courage, Goodpaster’s leadership succeeded in getting the first Allied tanks across the 
Rapido.118 
Only four days later, on the evening of 2 February 1944, the German artillery barrage 
struck near Goodpaster’s battalion staff and sprayed shrapnel through the group.  Unlike his 
first wounds, “relatively minor flesh wounds,” those inflicted by the artillery were severe.  
He was evacuated back to the hospital, where the surgeons discovered shell fragments had 
punched through his right elbow and caused extensive damage to the joint and arm.  By then, 
he knew he would not return to his battalion, a “trying moment, to realize that had come to an 
end.”119  
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Goodpaster’s evacuation from Italy ended not only his combat in World War II, but 
also his traditional engineer officer’s career path.120  He left the hospital in July 1944 and 
headed east to North Carolina to take command of an Engineer Group bound for Europe.  A 
War Department message reached him en route to the East Coast cancelling his command 
assignment and ordering him to report to Washington, D.C. for service at the War 
Department’s Operations Division, or OPD.  His response of “ah, hell…” signified his 
understanding of both the challenges ahead and the probable loss of his command 
assignment.121  Referred to as “General Marshall’s Washington Command Post,” OPD was 
the premier planning agency for the American war effort, responsible for the top level 
planning and coordination necessary for conducting a war in two theaters ten thousand miles 
apart.122   
Goodpaster’s selection for service with OPD was no accident, something he 
discovered when he reported to the Pentagon in August 1944.  Assigned to the Strategy and 
Policy section (S&P), Goodpaster found that his new boss was none other than his old 
economics instructor and debate coach from West Point, Colonel George “Abe” Lincoln.  
Lincoln, also an engineer officer, had learned through the informal network of engineer 
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wives that Goodpaster had been released from the hospital.123  Lincoln was searching for 
bright young officers to replenish the pool of planners in OPD.  Due to a War Department 
directive issued in August 1944, regular army officers who had not served overseas since 7 
December 1941 would be released from the staff following two years of duty.  The directive 
ensured that experienced officers were available for battalion command assignments, a 
requirement that became ever more urgent in the wake of the initial landings at Normandy 
and the breakout through France.   It also served to prevent officers from avoiding the war by 
staying in Washington.  In OPD the impact was significant, as twenty-nine officers in 
important strategy positions would leave for Europe or the Pacific by the end of 1944.   
The director of OPD, Major General Thomas Handy, wanted “regulars who have 
proven themselves in active theaters” as replacements.124  Goodpaster fit the description.  
More importantly, however, Lincoln knew and respected Goodpaster for his intellect and 
practical approach to problem solving.  Because the army lacked a training program for 
strategic planners, OPD selected officers based on recommendations from field commanders 
and the personal knowledge of OPD personnel.125  Officers chosen for OPD typically had to 
learn their jobs as they did them.  Lincoln’s status as an engineer officer, combined with the 
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tendency for top West Point graduates to select the engineer branch, put a disproportionate 
number of engineer officers in OPD.126   
Goodpaster tried hard to get out of the assignment, telling Lincoln, “I can only stay a 
short time - maybe six months.  There’s a command waiting for me in Europe.”127  Lincoln’s 
response, to “forget it and get to work,” dashed Goodpaster’s hopes.128  Lincoln’s refusal to 
release him almost certainly meant Goodpaster would not be promoted to Colonel before the 
end of the war.  For an ambitious, combat experienced young officer, the realization must 
have been disappointing.  His friend and West Point classmate, Stanley Dziuban, also tried to 
evade the long arm of Lincoln, to no avail.129 Goodpaster wrote to Dziuban to break the bad 
news.  “I am afraid that unless an act of God intervenes you will join the unhappy group in 
OPD.  I spoke to General Lincoln (the ex-Economics instructor) about it and the gist of his 
reply was ‘too bad.’”130  Goodpaster was one of the first of the new staff officers, but was 
soon joined by others whom Lincoln pulled into OPD, despite their best efforts to avoid the 
assignment. Notwithstanding his initial disappointment, Goodpaster soon realized that he had 
been granted a “marvelous opportunity, a chance to see outstandingly able men at work, and 
how they did things.”131  
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OPD helped formulate inter-service and international policy, directed the army’s 
operations, and maintained oversight of all army activity in the U.S. and the overseas 
theaters.  Inside OPD, Lincoln’s S&P was responsible for synthesizing military and foreign 
policy primarily by preparing position papers.132  The S&P section served as the primary 
political-military planning agency for the army, while Lincoln himself served as the “main 
link between the working echelons of the Army staff system and the joint and combined 
committee system” as the army planner.133  The Joint Staff was the top echelon of U.S. 
wartime planning, where the army, navy, and army air corps attempted to achieve consensus 
on planning issues.  The Combined Staff was the international U.S.-British staff that 
synchronized strategic requirements between the two nations. As the army planner in S&P, 
Lincoln had “an intimate knowledge of what the [Army] Chief of Staff [General George C. 
Marshall] thought on important issues.”134 OPD held the responsibility for reviewing all 
policy issues that went to Marshall, or were intended for presentation to the Joint or 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, which put Goodpaster and his fellow planners in regular contact 
with the Chief of Staff and with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.  
One of Goodpaster’s first projects in S&P illustrated the political-military nature of 
the planner’s work.  Lincoln directed him to draft a response to a British proposal for “light 
operations across the Adriatic against the Dalmatian coast.”  The “light operations” referred 
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to amphibious assault landings at Split, Sibenic, and Zadar on the Yugoslavian coast.  The 
proposal was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s pet project, but one the American 
Joint Chiefs had no intention of supporting, in the belief that any actions across the Adriatic 
into Yugoslavia would only detract from the allied main effort in France, which had by then 
succeeded in pushing the German army across the Seine River and liberating Paris.135   
Goodpaster’s experience in Italy was at the forefront of his mind as he considered the 
problems with the British proposal.  All three landing sites had narrow roads leading off the 
beaches and up steep escarpments.  The intelligence available suggested that the Germans 
would be able to reinforce the landing areas far faster than the allied forces would be able to 
move inland.  Goodpaster determined that any force landing on the shore would be 
confronted with the same problems he had so recently experienced on the Italian 
peninsula.136  His draft paper reflected his feelings about such an attempt “in rather florid 
language.”  Lincoln’s response was an important learning point for the new planner and 
illustrative of the care required in analyzing military issues with international political 
implications.  He told Goodpaster that General Marshall, for whom the response was being 
drafted, “did not wish to mock Mr. Churchill, now go clean this up!”137  The experience 
taught Goodpaster that he would have to be careful not to allow personal experiences to color 
his analysis of strategic problems.     
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As one of the newest planners, Goodpaster looked to the more experienced members 
of the S&P to learn how to plan strategic level operations.  He worked with some of the best 
military thinkers in the army, men like Lincoln, Colonel Charles “Tick” Bonesteel, Colonel 
Dean Rusk, and Colonel James McCormack, all of whom were former Rhodes Scholars and 
very focused on political-military  issues.138  Goodpaster also saw how senior army officers 
and civilians operated at the highest levels of the War Department.   
Goodpaster learned to appreciate the approach favored by Marshall, who told the 
planners, “If you can’t put the central issues on one page, you haven’t thought it through 
enough,” a philosophy of staff work that sought to distill the key elements of strategic 
problems and avoid unproductive “essay contests” among the staff.139  Marshall also insisted 
that OPD not attempt to micromanage the war in the theaters, but instead serve to coordinate 
theater efforts and provide resources to the theater commanders.  One way he accomplished 
the task was by requiring OPD staff officers to communicate with the theater staffs and make 
sure the OPD plans were understood and acceptable to the subordinate commanders.  
Marshall frequently asked “What does General Eisenhower think about this?” when staff 
officers came by with plans for Europe, or invoked General Douglas Macarthur’s name in the 
case of the Pacific.140   
The daily interaction with these men and the variety of projects the S&P dealt with 
provided a learning environment radically different from anything Goodpaster had previously 
experienced in his career.  Between his arrival at OPD in August 1944 and the end of the war 
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with Japan in August 1945, Goodpaster worked on twenty-seven major projects.  Almost half 
had direct political implications, including an analysis of the desirability of Russian 
participation in the war against Japan, the participation of French troops in the Pacific 
Theater, recommendations on the size and composition of the permanent post-war army, and 
proposed post-war basing rights in the Pacific.141  While those projects required the 
application of careful analysis and typically resulted in an S&P paper, the issue of Philippine 
independence, which arose in the spring of 1945, served to demonstrate the degree to which 
the military had become more influential in international relations.  
In early May 1945, the president-in-exile of the Philippines, Sergio Osmeña, visited 
the White House to gain reassurance that the U.S. would follow through on its promise to 
recognize Philippine independence on 4 July 1946.142   Osmeña feared the U.S. would renege 
on its 1934 promise because U.S. planners had not defined their requirements for military 
facilities in the Philippines, including naval and air bases.  President Harry Truman, new in 
office after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death, told Secretary of War Stimson that he wanted to 
resolve the issue of basing rights the following day.143  Stimson and Marshall returned to the 
Pentagon and called on Lincoln and S&P to come up with some options.  Lincoln, 
Goodpaster, and an Air Corps officer, Phil Greasley, went to Stimson’s office, where the 
Secretary of War explained that he desired a short statement to the effect that the U.S. would 
support Philippine independence, while leaving open the question of basing rights.  General 
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Marshall disagreed and thought that any agreement must include a detailed listing of 
requirements, because an “agreement in principle only will prove useless.”144  Stimson told 
the planners, “we’ve given you all the help we can, now get to it!”145   
The group worked all night and devised three options, one in Stimson’s preferred 
short format, one in Marshall’s long and detailed style, and a third consisting of a short 
statement and an attached, detailed appendix.  Marshall and Stimson agreed to the third, and 
while Marshall wanted signatures on the appendix, Stimson overruled him.  The two 
presidents signed the statement that morning.146  Thus, in less than a day, three military 
planners, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of War produced an international 
agreement signed by two presidents.  The State Department was not even consulted.   In part 
that was a result of President Truman’s penchant for snap decisions in the wake of his 
assumption of the presidency, but it also demonstrated the degree to which the military had 
assumed some authority in the conduct of international relations.147  Goodpaster came away 
from the experience with renewed appreciation for Marshall’s thought process, but also with 
a better understanding of the impact American military planners increasingly had on foreign 
policy issues.148  
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In early 1945 Lincoln directed Goodpaster to begin work on a plan to redeploy troops 
from Europe to the Pacific when the war against Germany was over.  The general concept 
was to shift the troops from Europe to the U.S. to build up a strategic reserve, which would 
then be moved into the Pacific Theater as the transportation became available.  In the initial 
review of redeployment options, Goodpaster found that no “sudden collapse” plan existed for 
Japan. Such plans for Europe existed, predicated on the possibility that the German war effort 
might collapse and end the war swiftly.  The discovery that no such plan had been prepared 
for Japan prompted Goodpaster to recommend that a plan be developed, in part because of 
limited Japanese efforts to explore options for ending the war.149   
Goodpaster became aware of those efforts through his contact with Bonesteel in the 
S&P’s Policy section, where Bonesteel was working on ways to convince the Japanese to 
surrender. Lincoln recommended to Marshall that a “sudden collapse” plan be prepared, and 
Marshall then recommended it to MacArthur.  MacArthur resisted, fearing that word would 
leak out, and that morale would be affected.150  MacArthur most likely feared a decline in the 
morale of his forces already in combat and those preparing to invade Japan.  Any hint that the 
U.S. was preparing for a collapse in the Japanese war effort could have resulted in reduced 
aggressiveness in the execution of ongoing combat operations, hence his reluctance and the 
need to keep such planning secret.  Marshall, however, insisted that the plan could be done 
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on a “close-hold” basis, and that it needed to be done.151  Consequently, Goodpaster found 
himself and several other planners on a plane bound for the Philippines, where he was to 
meet with MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific (SWPAC) staff to coordinate plans both for the 
invasion of Japan and the possibility of a sudden collapse of the Japanese war effort.   
The mission to the Pacific Theater was a whirlwind affair.  In two short weeks the 
planners achieved real progress on their objectives: as they reported, to “reach a closer 
understanding with the theater on redeployment; to obtain first-hand information on theater 
problems; to obtain information on future plans being developed by the theater; observe the 
scale and progress of preparations for future operations, and to become acquainted with the 
officers who are developing the plans.” 152    
Goodpaster also visited port facilities and assessed their suitability as staging areas, 
met with air corps and logistics staffs to coordinate shipping for the redeployment of 
personnel and equipment from Germany, and attended numerous meetings to help quell 
inter-service tensions between navy and army operations in the Pacific Theater. Before 
departing for Washington, Goodpaster met with the SWPAC staff again and reviewed their 
work on the “sudden collapse” plan, which SWPAC called BLACKLIST.153  The 
BLACKLIST plan essentially converted the assault forces organized for the invasion of 
Japan to occupation forces, albeit under much reduced logistic requirements.  The plan also 
proposed troop levels and acceptable reductions for the first year of the occupation, the basic 
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concepts of American military government operations in Japan, and the role of MacArthur’s 
headquarters in the occupation.  Because BLACKLIST was only a draft plan, MacArthur’s 
staff refused to allow Goodpaster to bring a copy back to OPD.  Goodpaster was permitted to 
make notes about the plan, and those later proved critical in the development of an 
occupation plan in Washington.154  OPD and S&P had long used visits by staff planners to 
maintain close ties with the theater planning staffs, but the firsthand knowledge of the theater 
level planning and preparation gained by Goodpaster and his colleagues became instrumental 
in the final planning tasks of the war.155   
As Goodpaster returned to Washington, President Truman received news at Potsdam, 
where he was meeting with the allied leaders, of the successful atomic bomb test.156  Lincoln 
was also at Potsdam, and the successful test increased the importance of Goodpaster’s trip 
because of the possibility that Japan could be forced into surrender without an invasion of the 
home islands, then scheduled for November 1945. 157  Goodpaster wired his report to 
Potsdam three days later.  He discussed some of the problems with the BLACKLIST plan, 
particularly the SWPAC staff’s poorly defined plan to use Japanese civilian agencies “for 
control purposes ‘as long as convenient,’” and the projected troop strength required to 
occupy Japan, estimated at 505,000 after the first year.  He noted that “[SWPAC] figures are 
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based on an estimate of what the U.S. public will accept.”158   Goodpaster’s report 
demonstrated that military planners in the overseas theaters had also learned to consider 
domestic political concerns in their strategic planning.159 
As soon as Lincoln returned from Potsdam, he assigned Goodpaster to the Joint War 
Plans Committee (JWPC) as his deputy.160  As head of the S&P Lincoln was also the chief 
army planner and a member of the JWPC, the planning committee that coordinated the 
individual services’ plans at the Joint Staff level.  Goodpaster’s knowledge of BLACKLIST 
was the critical element in the move to the JWPC.  Because MacArthur’s planners had not 
permitted copies of the plan, Goodpaster’s “copious notes” and thorough analysis provided 
the basis for the occupation planning conducted by the JWPC.161    
The Japanese surrendered on 14 August 1945, after the destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki by atomic bombs.  Goodpaster had not known about the atom bomb directly, but 
Lincoln had, and the possibility of its use had contributed to his accepting Goodpaster’s 
recommendation to explore sudden collapse options for Japan.162  With the sudden end to the 
war, the JWPC forwarded a modified version of the BLACKLIST plan to the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) for immediate implementation as the occupation 
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plan for Japan.163  Goodpaster’s recommendation to explore a “sudden collapse” plan, 
prompted by his knowledge of diplomatic initiatives to end the war, proved fortuitous when 
the war ended more rapidly than he had expected.  His knowledge of the occupation plan and 
his personal experience with conditions in the Pacific Theater, especially with regard to 
logistics issues and redeployment planning, made him particularly helpful in the hectic final 
days of the war. 
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 An Education in Political-Military Affairs
The end of the war did not ease the pressure on OPD or the JWPC.  Suddenly the 
overwhelming priority became demobilizing most of the eight million soldiers in uniform at 
the end of the war.  While a point system had been established in 1944 by Marshall to ensure 
orderly and fair transportation back to the United States, the process was not as rapid as 
many service members, their families, or their elected representatives wanted.164   The 
redeployment of troops from Europe to form the strategic reserve in the United States 
accelerated the demobilization process.  By the time the Japanese surrendered, fourteen of 
the seventeen divisions scheduled for redeployment were back in the U.S.165   
For Goodpaster and the planners in S&P, it was a chaotic period. In September 1945 
he worked almost exclusively on tasks related to demobilization.  He helped prepare remarks 
and notes for three congressional appearances by Marshall and members of OPD.  The 
Strategy Section in the S&P became increasingly concerned with issues that required troop 
resources, especially occupation duty, which included an array of difficult tasks: security, 
humanitarian aid, military government, and basic repair of important roads and facilities.166  
These tasks became critical, especially in Europe and Japan, where the army assumed 
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responsibility for feeding large portions of the population in the most war-ravaged areas.167  
Goodpaster, instructed by Lincoln, made the “arrangements to take care of [a] possible 
Venezia Giulia commitment,” a reference to the tense stand-off between Allied forces and 
Yugoslavian Communists around the port of Trieste in northeastern Italy.168  He also helped 
prepare a timeline for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Czechoslovakia, a move opposed by 
the State Department on the grounds that Soviet forces in that country already outnumbered 
U.S. troops and that further decreasing U.S. strength would cede that nation to Soviet 
control.169    
Goodpaster’s work on demobilization included twenty-two conferences with various 
government agencies on troop strength and transportation requirements in the month of 
September 1945 alone.  The strategic concerns over troop levels in places like Italy and 
Czechoslovakia occurred within the context of increased tensions between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union. In early September the American Secretary of State James Byrnes discovered 
at the Council of Foreign Ministers conference in London that the atomic bomb had less 
utility as a bargaining tool than some officials had hoped.170  Mutual tension and distrust 
developed between both nations through the fall of 1945. 
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By early 1946, the immediate rush of demobilization eased and the new army Chief 
of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the War Department attempted to stabilize the 
force structure to meet existing American commitments.  According to Eisenhower, “the 
Army let its heart run away with its head” in the rush to get troops home.171  By January 
1946, more than five million troops had demobilized, and Eisenhower faced the unenviable 
task of trying to staunch the outflow of personnel and meet the commitments of a globally 
dispersed force.172  For Goodpaster and the other planners, it was a period of intense effort 
and frustration.  In the post-war period the military services increasingly quibbled over 
resources and assumed partisan positions on a variety of topics, especially the issue of 
military unification. The deadlock over inter-service cooperation and restructuring carried 
over into the realm of strategic planning.  Goodpaster, working as Lincoln’s deputy on the 
JWPC, focused on preparing “a postwar military policy, an overall postwar strategic plan on 
a worldwide basis, and recommendations on U.S. requirements for postwar bases."173  The 
process was made considerably more difficult by the lack of inter-service cooperation and the 
inability of the State Department to formulate political guidance for military policy or 
provide substantive input on the issue of overseas basing rights. 
Goodpaster also worked on the first joint war plan to incorporate atomic weapons for 
use against the Soviet Union.  Code-named PINCHER, the plan relied on Air Corps strategic 
bombardment of the USSR using both the limited stock of atomic weapons and conventional 
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bombs.  The Air Corps would have to attack from overseas bases, which required 
cooperation from allies and caused further friction between the War and the State 
Departments, which frequently differed on the strategic value of territories under 
consideration as bases.174   
  After the rapid progress of events and ideas in the S&P in 1944-45, the progress 
made in the JWPC the following year was disappointing.  Writing to a former planner in the 
fall, 1946, Goodpaster reported that "life on the treadmill goes along much the same with 
most of us barely keeping up with our in baskets.  I have had several interesting projects to 
work on and some of them, by the time I have a long gray beard, may get somewhere.  The 
JCS mill however grinds just as slowly as it ever did, if not more so."175 
By the fall of 1946, the JWPC’s efforts at joint strategic planning had largely been 
stymied by the inter-service rifts at the JCS level.  Goodpaster reflected that “the failure to 
obtain resolution in the Chiefs of two or three basic problems prevented us from turning out 
what I would consider a satisfactory amount of work." He was similarly frustrated with 
Lincoln’s delays in approving some projects, describing Lincoln’s “familiar routine of 'why 
hasn't something been done about this?' and 'the most important part of the problem has been 
overlooked', while I made a successful attempt to keep my blood pressure from popping a 
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safety valve.  His solution was good—just as good as it was in the paper we handed him ten 
weeks earlier."176 
 
In October 1946 Goodpaster was released from his responsibilities with the JWPC 
and returned to the Strategy Section of S&P, where he began inquiring into education 
programs, an important part of the typical engineer officer’s career path.  The pre-war Corps 
of Engineers education program had been designed to ensure that all of its officers attended 
graduate school so that officers who had already commanded engineer companies or 
battalions would gain the technical knowledge for large civil engineering projects.  The 
Engineer Branch revived the program in 1946 and began sending officers off to graduate 
schools around the country.  Goodpaster and the other engineer officers in OPD were not sent 
to school in 1946, but it appeared as if they might be permitted to go in 1947, although 
Goodpaster had his doubts.  “My confidence weakens every time the subject comes up with 
General Lincoln," he grumbled. Although Goodpaster appreciated the experience in the 
JWPC, calling it a "quick, liberal education in some of the things that make the world go 
round," he wanted a more formal education.177 He was not, however, impressed with the 
Engineer Branch’s selection of degree programs and course offerings, which he regarded as 
too technically narrow for broad applications.   
In that regard, Goodpaster’s thinking was strongly influenced by civilian lecturers at 
the newly established National War College (NWC) in Washington, D.C.  Writing to the 
noted strategic thinker Bernard Brodie after attending his lecture at the NWC in the fall, 
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1946, Goodpaster remarked on Brodie’s call “for continued education of a broad nature for 
Army and Navy officers at civilian institutions."  Goodpaster was not a student at the NWC, 
but many of the OPD officers attended lectures there when they had the time, especially 
when the lectures were given by top experts in fields like strategy, economics, and 
international relations. Goodpaster was “much impressed with the need for the objective and 
scientific - as opposed to partisan or doctrinaire - approach to the large problems confronting 
the military today."  Goodpaster believed that a broader education would provide a solution 
to some of the service parochialism he had experienced on the JWPC since “with the best 
intent in the world, many able officers seem unable to achieve the essential degree of 
detachment, and escape from the confines of vision which pre-occupation with branch or 
service assignment imposes."178   
Goodpaster was not the only army officer influenced by the lectures of important 
academics at the National War College that fall. General Eisenhower, disappointed with the 
failures of the JCS to agree on the most pressing issues of the post-war period, found a 
possible solution in a lecture by Dr. James Conant, the president of Harvard University.  
Conant insisted that the military commit itself to the long term study of future strategic 
problems.  Eisenhower saw it as an opportunity for the army and the War Department to 
begin dealing with strategic problems without the need for JCS consensus.  As he was far too 
occupied running the army to give the problem the necessary attention, he directed Major 
General Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations (P&O), the newly restructured 
replacement for OPD, to conduct such a long term study.179   
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Norstad, on Lincoln’s recommendation, assigned Goodpaster and Colonel Don 
Zimmerman to set up a small group of officers to begin examining the strategic problems of 
the atomic age.  The result was the establishment of the Advanced Study Group (ASG) on 22 
January 1947. 180   Eisenhower’s instructions to the ASG were deliberately vague: “evolve 
concepts of national security in light of the advancements of the atomic age, consider the 
effects of such concepts . . . prepare studies and recommendations which may be utilized in 
establishing appropriate . . . concepts and policies by the War Department agencies.”181  
In their initial meeting, Eisenhower directed Goodpaster and Zimmerman to establish 
a basic philosophy of national security and granted them virtual autonomy in their daily 
operations, methods of study, areas of research, and access to other agencies in the War 
Department.  Eisenhower explained that he wanted long range thinking in areas to which he 
could not devote much attention.  He told the officers that concepts they developed could be 
brought to him at any time and encouraged them to do so.182  The Group was to have nothing 
to do with current affairs, training, or other issues that “belonged to other people.”183  In 
short, Eisenhower was establishing an internal think-tank for the army and wanted them to 
become the experts on the subject of future war and the problems of fighting it, so well 
versed and so highly regarded that they would be asked to speak at universities. Initially, the 
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members focused on reading a broad selection of texts on economics, international relations, 
and history. Eisenhower encouraged them to communicate with academics at Princeton, 
Harvard, Columbia, Yale, and other top universities.  Goodpaster had already contacted 
Bernard Brodie, as well as Edward Earle at Princeton, Grayson Kirk and Harold Sprout at 
Columbia, and Conant at Harvard in the course of his investigation into alternative education 
programs.  They offered support for the ASG project in the form of consultation and 
introductions to other influential academics. 
  At the outbreak of World War II, Marshall, unhappy with the stagnation that had 
developed in the senior ranks of the army, removed a number of senior officers from War 
Department command and staff positions, making room for talented younger officers to 
advance rapidly.184  Eisenhower also emphasized the importance of finding high quality 
officers to sustain the ASG program, probably influenced by his experience in the inter-war 
period.  Goodpaster responded by issuing a memorandum to the ASG in March 1947 
suggesting that the best way to achieve a predictable rotation of qualified officers for the 
ASG was for the current members to nominate candidates.185  The suggestion, reminiscent of 
the OPD recruiting practices of World War II, resulted in a substantial list of promising 
junior officers.186   
In late March, Goodpaster and Lincoln joined a special committee to examine the 
financial, technical, and military aid necessary to support the Marshall Plan, created to speed 
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European recovery after World War II.  Marshall, then the Secretary of State and concerned 
by the lack of economic recovery in war-ravaged countries, requested an analysis of what 
support would be needed by which countries. The special committee functioned as a sub-
committee of the SWNCC to establish the basic components of the Marshall Plan, including 
the national security objectives of the U.S. and the conditions attached to aid.  Goodpaster 
and Lincoln advocated a global approach, but the State Department representatives, George 
Kennan and Charles Bohlen, soon convinced the officers that such an approach would be too 
broad and too expensive.  Kennan and Bohlen recommended a “Europe first” approach to 
recovery, arguing that reconstructing and repairing was easier than building something that 
had never existed.  The State Department planners also preferred an approach that offered 
European nations a role in shaping the plan.187  The Marshall Plan included ideas from both 
the War and State Departments, but its principles corresponded more closely with the State 
Department’s ideas. Marshall delivered his speech on European recovery a month later at the 
Harvard University graduation.188   
While Goodpaster worked on the ASG project and the early stages of the Marshall 
Plan, his efforts to secure a broad education instead of a narrowly engineer-oriented course of 
study came to the attention of General Norstad.  Goodpaster’s contacts with the civilian 
academic community as part of the ASG project helped the Director of P&O attain some 
leverage over what types of education planning officers could secure.  At Lincoln’s urging, 
Goodpaster forwarded the information he had received from Princeton, Yale, and Columbia 
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with the copies of his inquiry letters.  Enthusiastic, Norstad endorsed Goodpaster’s request 
for “broader studies of history and political affairs fitted to plans and policy work on the War 
Department General Staff.”189  Norstad forwarded an official proposal from P&O through the 
Personnel and Administration Division of the War Department to get Goodpaster, Edward 
Rowny, and Stanley Dziuban, the three engineer officers scheduled for school, approved for 
a more liberal program of study that incorporated international relations, history and 
economics.   
The response from the chief of personnel actions, Major General Willard S. Paul, was 
not encouraging.  In disapproving the request he told Norstad that "the only excuse for this 
combination is to assist the officers personally."190  “The insinuation of self-seeking” angered 
all three who thought, in Goodpaster’s words “that we deserved better than that.”191  Norstad 
explained to Paul that "a major object in getting these people into school . . . is that of having 
them performing missionary work for the army among a group of eminent scholars and 
future public administrators."192   
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In the end, the disapproval of the Administration Division had little effect on 
Goodpaster, who departed in July 1947 for a two year school assignment to Princeton 
University "with wide latitude of choice as to the courses to be pursued."193  Goodpaster did 
not know it at the time, but the ultimate decision on the modified schooling plan for the P&O 
officers was made by the Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower.  As the Assistant 
Director of P&O remembered it, “Norstad reached the conclusion that Goodpaster was one of 
the most exceptionally outstanding officers of his grade in the entire service.” Norstad 
“brought this matter personally to the attention of Gen[eral] Eisenhower, with the suggestion 
that Goodpaster be particularly earmarked for further development” and “Eisenhower was 
instrumental in his assignment to Princeton University as a graduate student.”194   
 
Andrew Goodpaster went on to earn a Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton 
and a long career in the army, characterized by frequent staff assignments at the highest 
echelons of the army and the government, working on the most critical national security 
issues, and culminating in a five-year stint as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.  
Eisenhower selected him as a founding member of the NATO military headquarters in 1951 
and then as White House Staff Secretary in 1954, a testament to Goodpaster’s intelligence, 
character, and experience.  When Eisenhower was asked about Goodpaster after appointing 
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him Staff Secretary, the president replied "I would ask nothing more than for my son to grow 
up to be as good a man as he is."195 
Goodpaster’s childhood in the Midwest, the lessons imparted by his parents and 
teachers, his struggles during the Depression, and his natural intelligence combined to 
produce a bright young man accustomed to dealing with adversity.  His parents proved the 
fundamental influence on his early life, the stern practicality of his father balanced by the 
compassionate care of his mother.  When the Depression prevented him from achieving his 
career goals he sought a new route to success, first by putting on the “heavy shoes” of an 
industrial laborer, and then by competing for a West Point appointment.  With that 
experience, a measure of personal ambition, and an appreciation for practicality, Goodpaster 
entered West Point, an experience that transformed his life.   
At some point during the four years at West Point—one he never could identify—the 
Academy ceased to be an escape from the Depression and a ticket to a free education and 
instead became the entrée-point to a lifetime of service.  In the crucible of West Point, 
Andrew Goodpaster excelled both in the classroom and in military training, gained the 
lasting respect of classmates and instructors, and found the love of his life, Dorothy 
Anderson. In the process, he also internalized the West Point value structure, especially the 
importance of duty and personal responsibility.  In fact, Goodpaster measured himself and 
other officers against the standard of duty throughout his life, and expected the standard to be 
met.  In court-martial proceedings, training, strategic planning, career choices, and most 
importantly, on the battlefield, Andrew Goodpaster prized the performance of duty above all 
other qualities.        
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Upon graduating from the Academy, Goodpaster went to Panama, where he learned 
the fundamentals of military engineering and practical leadership, the type of adaptive 
problem solving that could not be learned in a West Point classroom or a supervised drill in 
summer encampments.  After Pearl Harbor he put those skills into practice in engineer units 
in Panama and Louisiana, where he honed his skills in the combat aspects of military 
engineering.  Deployed to the Mediterranean in 1943, Goodpaster led his battalion and later 
the 1108th Engineer Group in the brutal Italian campaign.   In command, Goodpaster 
demonstrated the prized qualities of an army officer: courage, intelligence, determination, 
and commitment to his mission and his men.  Twice wounded and recipient of two of the 
army’s highest awards for valor, he returned to the United States and played a key role as an 
army strategic planner.  
For Andrew Goodpaster, assignments and duties from 1944 through 1947 gave him a 
unique education in political-military affairs.  He participated in planning the invasion of 
Japan and its occupation, the post-war demobilization, and the army’s initial attempts to 
come to grips with atomic warfare.  He witnessed firsthand the internecine conflict within the 
U.S. government as the War Department, State Department, and Department of the Navy 
fought for resources and roles in the post-war period.  Eisenhower’s response to the problems 
of demobilization and the disunity of the Joint Chiefs eventually led to his formation of the 
Advanced Study Group and a real effort to move beyond the stagnant planning processes 
embodied in the post-war JWPC.  Goodpaster’s involvement in these different projects, 
combining military and political affairs, provided him with an exceptional grounding in 
national security studies.  He honed his skills under the tutelage of great army leaders and the 
best army minds: Lincoln, Bonesteel, Marshall, Norstad, and Eisenhower. He later described 
68 
 
it as “a great school – how people of that stature handled their jobs.”196  The experience also 
brought Goodpaster to the attention of powerful men who remained involved in his career for 
many years to come. 
Goodpaster’s experiences demonstrated changes in the way the army, especially 
senior officers, mentored and developed promising young officers.  The army did poorly in 
the systematic development of strategic planners at least into the early 1950s, when Lincoln 
declared, “some more good minds had better move toward the Pentagon.” Lincoln opined 
that, “progressively, since 1947 or perhaps earlier, we have moved to depend too much on 
organization and procedures—not enough on men.”197 Lincoln referred in part to the army’s 
post-war institutionalization of personnel selection for OPD positions—while more 
systematic than the personal selection method Lincoln had used, officer assignments also 
became more bureaucratic and less flexible.  The attempts to secure broader education for 
some officers reflected one attempt to mitigate the problem, but it was a stop-gap measure at 
best.   
Andrew Goodpaster’s selection for advanced education reflected the reality that army 
patronage in the post-war period was in some ways not very different from the pre-war army. 
In short, rising to positions of importance and authority still took more than just ability.  
Goodpaster’s early career demonstrated the importance of being noticed and having 
connections within the service.  While he may have earned any consideration he received, 
Goodpaster’s advancement was certainly aided by the influence of powerful men like 
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Lincoln and Eisenhower, and later by Generals J. Lawton Collins, Matthew Ridgway, and 
Maxwell Taylor.  Even as the importance of connections persisted, the nature of senior 
officer mentorship changed.  The post-war army left little time for senior leaders to take 
personal interest in developing promising subordinates.  To some degree, advanced education 
offered an alternative to the old mentorship model, and other officers, in increasing numbers, 
followed Goodpaster to civilian universities or the military’s war colleges.  
Finally, Andrew Goodpaster’s experience illuminated the army’s growing 
involvement in the conduct of political-military affairs.  Over the course of World War II, 
partly as a result of President Franklin Roosevelt’s personal control of foreign policy and 
partly as a result of the growing power of the War Department, the military accrued a degree 
of institutional power in foreign and military policy.  To some degree that was a result of the 
State Department’s inability to consistently and reliably provide quick, well-reasoned foreign 
policy recommendations, but it also reflected the military’s growing involvement in political-
military issues like overseas basing rights, governing occupied territories, and assessments of 
domestic political support for military operations. The vast resources of the War Department 
during World War II enabled the military to expand its involvement in political-military 
affairs, and the global commitment of American military forces after the war allowed it to 
consolidate much of that power.   
Andrew Goodpaster’s later career was largely spent in positions where he either 
advised others about political-military affairs or participated directly in the conduct of such 
affairs.  That later career, however, was anchored in his experiences before, during, and after 
World War II, especially the education in political-military affairs he gained from 1944 
through 1947.    By 1947 he had become a broadly experienced as well as highly intelligent, 
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ambitious officer and proved himself both in combat and in the highest staff organizations in 
the army. In Lincoln, Marshall, and Eisenhower he found the mentors and role models that 
shaped his career, and emerged as an officer respected for his intellect, commitment to duty, 
and extraordinary potential for future service.   
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